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THE SOUND OF ONE FORM BATILING
Comments on Daniel Keating's
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action'
Richard Craswell*
Daniel Keating has provided a thoughtful and useful study of the
way that businesses form contracts.1 In particular, he has given us a
good deal of data concerning the problem known as the "battle of the
forms." Commercial lawyers have, of course, been wrangling over this
problem for decades, so it is no small accomplishment to be able to of
fer a useful contribution.
In Part I below, I describe more precisely just what Keating's data
does and does not illuminate. Parts II and III then focus on a particu
lar contracting practice that Keating has identified: the practice of
getting both parties to sign a "master agreement" in advance of a se
ries of deals. These master agreements let the parties agree in ad
vance to the terms that will govern their subsequent deals, without
leaving those terms to depend on the invoices and other forms that
will subsequently be exchanged. This encapsulation of the parties'
agreement in a single document could be said to eliminate the battle
entirely, for it certainly solves many of the technical problems that
plague commercial lawyers whenever the parties' documents fail to
match. I argue, though, that these master agreements may not solve
all of the objections that some courts and some scholars have raised in
"battle of the forms" cases. While I believe these objections are mis
guided, they may nevertheless be influential, so there is at least a ques
tion about how often these master agreements will be upheld by
courts.

I.

THE BEHAVIOR BEHIND THE CONTRACTING BEHAVIOR

At the outset, it is worth clarifying what Keating's study does and
does not address. His study tells us a good deal about contracting be
havior: about how businesses draft standard forms, negotiate with one
another, and so on. However, his study does not attempt to examine
the underlying economic behavior those contracts govern - that is,
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Keating does not study the production, pricing, or sale of actual goods.
As a result, his study does not address the issues that are most central
to the normative literature on the battle of the forms.
For example, one issue raised by that normative literature is
whether it should be easier or harder for sellers to displace the
U.C.C.'s standard default rules. Unless the parties agree otherwise,
the U.C.C. makes sellers liable for all consequential damages caused
by any defect that leaves a product less than "merchantable,"2 and this
rule is sometimes criticized as inefficient. 3 If this criticism is correct an issue to which I return below - then it might be desirable to give
sellers an easy way to contract around those default rules, perhaps by
specifying some other remedy in their standard form. Other scholars,
however, argue that sellers' forms may be inefficient in the opposite
direction, by being overly stingy toward buyers (for example, by dis
claiming any warranty entirely).4 If this criticism is correct, we might
be better off with a battle-of-the-forms rule that made it harder for
sellers to contract around the U.C.C.'s default remedies.
My only point here is that a study such as Professor Keating's can
not resolve the question of whether the U.C.C.'s default remedies are
either more or less efficient than those that appear in sellers' (or buy
ers') standard forms. This is because the efficiency of any remedial
provision - either a default remedy in the U.C.C., or a remedy stipu
lated in a standard form - depends on the underlying economic be
havior that will be governed by the contract. For example, a clause
disclaiming all warranties might indeed be inefficient (all else being
equal) if the resulting freedom from liability reduced sellers' incen
tives to produce merchantable products, leading to inefficiently low
levels of product quality. To test this hypothesis, though, we would
need to measure actual product quality to see whether sellers whose
forms disclaimed warranty liability tended to produce lower-quality
products than those whose forms did not. In other words, the under
lying economic beh_avior - in this case, the level of quality produced
by sellers - is what must be studied to resolve this normative debate.
The same is true of the contrary claim, that the U.C.C.'s default
remedies are inefficient because they are overly generous to buyers.
For example, the default remedy of full liability for all consequential
damages might be inefficient if it unduly reduced buyers' incentives to
take their own steps to reduce those consequential damages. This de-

2.

u.c.c. §§

2-314, 2-715(2).

3. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1250-51 (1982); Victor P. Goldberg,
The "Battle of the Forms": Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV.155,
157 (1997).
4. E.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
(1983). I discuss this criticism infra at notes 14-19.
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fault remedy might also be inefficient ifit led to cross-subsidization of
some buyers by others5 -for example, ifsmall buyers who were un
likely to suffer large consequential damages were charged the same
price as larger buyers whose consequential losses were likely to be
more severe. To tests these hypotheses, though,we would again have
to study the underlying economic behavior of buyers and sellers. To
evaluate the first effect,we would have to study the actual precautions
taken by buyers to minimize their consequential damages in the event
of a breach. To evaluate the second, we would have to study the ac
tual prices set by sellers who were subject to liability for full conse
quential damages. In particular,we would have to study the extent to
which those prices did or did not vary with the consequential damages
likely to be suffered by any particular buyer.
Obviously, Professor Keating's study does not attempt to shed
light on this underlying business behavior. Keating interviewed law
yers to learn how businesses draft standard forms, and how they re
spond to forms offered by others. He did not interview engineers to
learn how businesses make product quality decisions, or accountants
and sales managers to learnhow businesses set prices. This is what I
mean when I say that Keating's study tells us much about contracting
behavior,but little about the underlying economicbehavior those con
tracts might affect.
Ishould add at once that this observation is not a criticism of Pro
fessor Keating. Keating's method of interviewing business people is a
useful way of gaining insights into how contracts are formed, but I
doubt that it would have been nearly so useful as a way of assessing
underlying price and quality behavior. There are, after all, any num
ber of factors that influence the price that a business charges; and a
sales manager who is asked about her pricing decision is unlikely even
to mention U.C.C. section 2-207 as one of the factors in her decision.
She is more likely to respond only in general terms -for example,
"We charge enough to cover our costs," or "We charge whatever the
market will bear." Interviews of product quality engineers likely will
produce similarly general answers - for example, "We produce the
most durable product that we can;" or, if pressed, "Yes, we could
make our product even more durable, but our customers wouldn't pay
that much."
To be sure, these general responses are still consistent with the
possibility that the legal rule does have some effect on price and qual
ity decisions. After all, ifthe legal rule affects all sellers' costs (or all
buyers' behavior), it thereby would influence the equilibrium in the
market as a whole,thus helping determine what prices customers were
in fact willing to pay,or what prices the market would bear. But these
5. See Gwyn D. Quillen, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1125 (1988).
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effects of the legal rule will be remote and indirect (assuming they ex
ist at all): they will be an invisible part of the background environ
ment that sales managers and product engineers take as given. As a
result, interviews of the sort that Keating conducted are likely to be of
little use in assessing the law's indirect effects.
I can only add, regrettably, that it is also difficult to study these in
direct effects even through more formal, statistical methods. In prin
ciple, one could measure the prices and product quality chosen by
various sellers under various remedial regimes - while also collecting
data on all of the other factors that affect sellers' choices of price and
quality - and then analyze the statistics to try to isolate the effect of
different remedial rules. But data are extremely difficult to gather
even on the main variables of concern - price and quality. It is even
more difficult to get data on all of the other factors that would have to
be controlled for (for example, changes in raw material costs and
changes in customer demand) to isolate statistically the effects of any
change in the remedial rule. Thus, while it would be wonderful to
have such studies (and efforts in that direction should be championed
wholeheartedly), this is not an avenue of research that is likely to give
us answers any time soon.
Still, the unattainable best should not be the enemy of the merely
good. That is, even though we lack studies that would give us the an
swers we ultimately need, interviews like Professor Keating's can still
tell us a good deal about various prior or intermediate questions. I
tum now to one such implication of Keating's study, which seems to
me to deserve further comment.
II.

CONTRACTING AROUND THERULES FOR
CONTRACTING AROUND

I refer here to the practice of firms that require their suppliers or
customers to sign a "master agreement" in which they specify an en
tire set of rules to govern subsequent dealings between the parties.6 In
effect, these firms have abandoned the effort to draft forms that, if ex
changed in connection with each individual contract, would survive the
application of section 2-207 and give the seller (or the buyer) the
terms it wanted. Instead, these firms have opted out of section 2-207
entirely by providing a different set of rules - the rules in the "master
agreement" - by which the terms of each subsequent contract will be
determined.
This practice is of interest for several reasons. To begin with, most
of the prior literature on section 2-207 assumed (quite plausibly) that
the fundamental problem was one of high transaction costs. At least
6. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2696. Keating refers to these agreements as "practices
that eliminate the battle."
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for businesses with large numbers of purchases or sales, it simply is not
worth the time it would take to h ammer out an explicit agreement
about every possible contingency that might arise in every single con
tract. Indeed, for most such businesses it probably is not worth any
one's time to actually read every provision in every document. As
Victor Goldberg has put it, "[m]aintaining lawyers on the loading dock
is not cheap."7
What Keating's interviews tell us, though, is that the transaction
costs required to read and understand a contract do not necessarily
have to be incurred again and again for every single contract. Instead,
if a buyer and seller expect to deal repeatedly, they can agree once on
a master contract which itself supplies the terms for each subsequent
"contract" they might enter into. Because this master contract need
only be read and negotiated once, the cost of reading and negotiating
can be spread over a number of subsequent transactions. In effect, the
cost per transaction has been reduced. Put slightly differently, even
firms that do not find it worthwhile to read and negotiate the terms of
each individual shipment (the "lawyers on the loading dock" scenario)
might still find it worthwhile to read and negotiate the terms of an en
tire, long-lasting relationship.
To be sure, the mere fact that these master agreements are avail
able does not, by itself, establish that they deserve legal enforcement.
I will address that issue below in Part III. For now, my only point is
that one of the assumptions underlying the previous literature on the
battle-of-the-forms - to wit, that it generally is infeasible for firms to
read and negotiate explicit provisions governing all their dealings - is
now demonstrably untrue, at least for some contracting parties. Even
if this were all that Keating's study demonstrated (and it is not), that
fact alone would be a significant contribution.
More generally, the "master agreements" phenomenon also shows
that there are different ways to contract around a default rule. When
we speak of "contracting around a default rule," we usually imagine
firms agreeing to alter some particular rule - a default remedial pro
vision, for example, or an implied warranty. Firms that sign master
agreements certainly do this, if the terms of the master agreement dif
fer from the otherwise applicable default rules. Less obviously, how
ever, the master agreements also alter the default rules that would
otherwise govern the contract formation process itself, including the
rule found in U.C.C. section 2-207. That is, firms that sign master
agreements thereby agree that the terms of future dealings will not be
those that are found in any subsequent expression of acceptance (as
would otherwise be the case under section 2-207(1)), plus any addi
tional terms that would otherwise qualify under section 2-207(2). In-

7. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 164.
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stead, these firms purport to be agreeing that the terms of future
dealings will be the terms spelled out in the master agreement itself,
without regard to any subsequent invoices or confirmations that might
be exchanged. In effect, then, these firms are opting out of the forma
tion regime represented by the current section 2-207 at the same time
that they opt out of particular substantive default rules.
This point may be made slightly differently by noting that it is now
customary to divide contract law into mandatory rules and default
rules, with the latter being those that firms are allowed to change by
private agreement.8 This classification, however, is incomplete, for the
possibility of displacing default rules by private agreement means that
contract law must also contain a set of enabling rules, or rules that
specify how such agreements can be made.9 Indeed, the current sec
tion 2-207 is one such enabling rule, for it specifies what the parties
must usually do to succeed (or to fail to succeed) in displacing an oth
erwise applicable default rule. What Keating's study shows, however,
is that firms have treated section 2-207 as being itself merely a default
rule - a "default enabling procedure," if one wishes to be precise which is therefore subject to alteration by prior agreement of the par
ties. (Again, Part III will take up the question of whether such prior
agreements will succeed in their aim, or whether courts will instead re
sist such attempts.)
Viewed in these terms, the master agreements might be analogized
more appropriately to arbitration clauses, or other choice-of-law pro
visions, by which parties do not merely displace particular default
rules but specify an entire regime of applicable rules. They might also
be analogized to trade associations of the sort studied by Lisa
Bernstein,10 in which members agree (either explicitly or implicitly) to
be bound by the rules of the association. To be sure, trade association
rules and choice-of-law provisions may displace existing law more
comprehensively than do the master agreements found by Keating,
which typically change only the formation rules (including section 2207) plus the particular substantive rules the parties happen to ad
dress. Another difference is that trade association rules usually evolve
8. For a discussion of this distinction (and its place in the contracts literature), see Ian
& Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 87-93 (1989).

Ayres

9. I have elsewhere referred to these as "agreement rules." Richard Craswell, Contract
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 503 (1989). For

economic analyses of other rules governing contract formation, see, for example, Richard
Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996).
10. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2001); Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992).
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over long periods of time, as a result of politicking and negotiation
among a sizeable membership, while the master agreements identified
by Keating are more likely to have been drafted recently by a single
firm. (This difference may be relevant to courts' willingness to uphold
such agreements, as I discuss below in Part III.)
My point, for now, is simply that firms seem to be increasingly in
terested in opting out of default rules on a wholesale basis - that is,
by contracting around large sets of default rules at once, rather than
contracting around one rule at a time (or one transaction at a time), as
is implicitly assumed by much of the default rules literature. This is a
contracting phenomenon, so it is quite suitable for study by Keating's
chosen method (i.e., by interviewing corporate counsel), and he has
provided a valuable service by calling it to our attention.
III. WINNING THE BATILE AND LOSING THEWAR?
While this new method of altering default rules raises a number of
interesting questions, the most obvious question is whether the
method is likely to be successful. After all, courts often resist attempts
to alter individual default rules, either by interpreting the contractual
language in a way that negates the attempt, or by throwing out the
language as unconscionable.11 Historically, courts have sometimes
been even more resistant to terms that specify entire alternative sys
tems of law, such as arbitration clauses.12
The answer to this question may depend, in part, on just how one
conceives of the "problem" to which the battle-of-the-forms rule is the
answer. According to one view, it is merely a technical problem of of
fer and acceptance, which arises when (and only when) there is no sin
gle document that both parties have assented to. In such a case, a
battle-of-the-forms rule is needed to determine which document will
be enforced as the parties' contract. But if the parties have, instead,
signed the same master agreement, this technical problem disappears,
for the court can simply enforce the terms of the master agreement.
In short, if both parties have signed the same form, it is impossible (on
this view) for there to be any battle.

11. For a discussion of the argument that judicial interpretation makes it harder for par
ties to alter default rules, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CAL. L. REV. 261, 290-92 (1985); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpreta
tion and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 {1997). For a discussion of the similar
effects produced by the unconscionability doctrine, see Richard Craswell, Property Rules
and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. an. L. REV. 1, 32-34
{1993), and the other articles cited there.
12 See, e.g., W.H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 214 P. 38 (Cal. 1923) (refusing to enforce
arbitration clause as contrary to public policy).
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There is, however, another view of the "battle of the forms" that
focuses on a qifferent sort of battle: one that is present even when
both parties have signed the same form. On this view, the problem
posed by battle-of-the-forms cases is merely one version of the more
general problem presented by all standard forms, which is that such
forms often are imposed by the stronger party on the weaker without
any real agreement. This is the view that sees "contracts of adhesion"
as inherently suspicious, leading to the conclusion that courts should
scrutinize all such contracts and withhold enforcement from any terms
deemed unfair.13 On this view, then, the absence of any apparent "bat
tle" may mean that the stronger party already has won a decisive vic
tory, and thus has been able to dictate the terms of surrender.14 If
courts incline to this view, master agreements of the sort described by
Keating will not be upheld except when they are seen as having been
freely consented to by both sides, rather than having been imposed by
a stronger party on a weaker one.
Of course, this second view has engendered a good deal of criti
cism in legal scholarship, especially from an economic perspective.15 It
is notoriously difficult to define what should count as "free consent,"
especially in any way that does not render all contracts invalid, and
thus require judicial scrutiny of every term in every contract.16 Indeed,
from an economic perspective the relevant question is not whether
consent was truly "free" (however that term might be defined), but
whether judicial scrutiny of contract terms will produce better or
worse results than simply enforcing such contracts as written, thereby
leaving the terms to depend on whatever constraints market forces

13. For an early expression of this viewpoint, see Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhe
sion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). More
recent examples include John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Con
trol of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); and Rakoff, supra note 4.
14. Significantly, many scholars who favor a strong doctrine of unconscionability to po
lice "contracts of adhesion" also endorse the use of § 2-207 to set aside terms in buyers' or
sellers' standard forms in favor of the U.C.C.'s normal default rules. E.g., John E. Murray,
Jr., Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient Uncon
scionability, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 597 (1978); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Con
tract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 5760 (1984).
15. For early criticisms, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L . & ECON. 293 (1975); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in
Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1976); Michael J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Ine
quality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U.
TORONTO L.J. 359 (1976); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscion
ability, 63 VA. L. REv. 1053 (1977). Similar concerns are noted in Douglas G. Baird, Com
mercial Norms and the Fine Art of the Small Con: Comments on Daniel Keating's 'Exploring
the Battle of the Forms', 98 MICH. L. REV. 2716 (2000).
16. Relatively few advocates of the second view have been willing to suggest that virtu
ally all contracts should be subject to this sort of judicial scrutiny. A possible exception is
Rakoff, supra note 4.
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may or may not provide.17 In other words, economists would want to
ask questions like: How well are market forces working in the market
in question? Are buyers reasonably well-informed, so that any seller
that offers unfavorable terms is likely to suffer a loss in business? Or
are buyers almost completely oblivious to the contract terms, so a
seller could profit by using a one-sided term even if the term were not
in fact efficient? Economists would also ask analogous questions
about judicial review of contract terms: How good are courts at de
ciding which terms are indeed in buyers' interests? Will courts prop
erly assess the extent to which striking down a term might lead sellers
to raise prices, or to respond in other ways that might leave buyers
worse off? Or will courts be unable to understand such issues, and
end up making matters worse than if the courts had not even tried to
evaluate contract terms, and had instead simply enforced the contracts
as written?18
Nevertheless, in spite of two decades of economic skepticism,
courts often continue to write as though standard forms (or "contracts
of adhesion") were proper objects of suspicion.19 Indeed, Professor
Keating's own discussion provides some support for this view. In de
scribing the master agreements that he found, Keating says that they
are used most often by "some of the larger companies,"20 who are later
described as adopting "a more or less take-it-or-leave-it approach to
their forms," and as "ha[ving] the leverage to insist on the other side
signing its form."21 To be sure, these descriptions may be mere tau
tologies: in a sense, any party who succeeds in getting its own terms
must necessarily have had "leverage" sufficient to "insist" that the
other party agree. But the connotation of these descriptions does not
suggest the kind of voluntary assent that sometimes is seen as essential
17. I discuss this question at more length in Craswell, supra note 11, and in Richard
Craswell, Remedies When Contracts Lack Consent: Autonomy and Institutional Competence,
33 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 209 {1995).
18. As Arthur Leff once put it, the regulation of contract terms can have:
important economic (and therefore social) costs. If carried forward with vigor, no lawful
contract could descend in 'fairness' or 'safety' below a certain qualitative minimum. In cer
tain situations that would have the same effect as some building codes: the cheapest one can
get is more expensive than one can afford.
Arthur A. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 155 {1970).
19. For example, courts continue to cite the language of Henningsen v.

Bloomfield Mo-

tors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (NJ. 1960):
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who are brought together
by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of approximate economic
equality.
But in present-day commercial life the standardized mass contract has ap
peared. It is used primarily by enterprises with strong bargaining power and position.
. . •

See, e. g. ,

Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-Graphics, Inc., 607 A.2d 703, 704 {N.J. 1992);
Multi-Family Management, Inc. v. Hancock, 664 A.2d 1210, 1227 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995).
20. Keating,
21.

supra note 1, at 2697.

Id. at 2702.
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to freedom of contract by judges (or scholars) who lean toward the
second view described above.
Interestingly,one recent proposal to revise section 2-207 embraced
elements of both of the views I have just described. In this proposal,
section 2-207 (a) (2) provided that the contract consists of,among other
things, "terms ...to which both parties have agreed."22 This language
would seem to validate terms in a master agreement that has been
signed by both parties.23 Of course, such terms could still be chal
lenged under the general provision on unconscionability, but, in that
respect,the proposed revision is no different from the current version
of section 2-207.
At the same time, though, the proposed section 2-207 (b) (l) added
new language that would have permitted the enforcement even of
terms to which the buyer "h
' as not otherwise agreed," as long as the
buyer did not object within twenty or thirty days after he received the
contract,and as long as the terms, "taken as a whole ...do not mate
rially alter the contract to the detriment of the buyer."24 This proposal
thus embraced the belief that some contract terms have not, in any
meaningful sense,been "otherwise agreed to "by the buyer. However,
the proposal provided that those terms could still be enforced,as long
as they did not inflict a material detriment on buyers.25 Obviously,
under this language,it was the courts who would have to decide which
terms, in fact, worked to buyers' detriment (when the terms were
"taken as a whole "),and when that detriment was sufficiently large to
be "material." Thus, t_ his aspect of the proposed revision also re
flected at least some degree of faith in the ability of judges to deter
mine which terms are in buyers'interests and which terms are not. In
that respect, the proposal was very consistent with the second view
outlined above.
There are, of course, further questions that would have had to be
answered to fully assess the impact of the proposed revision. For ex
ample, when courts evaluated such terms "taken as a whole," would
they also have evaluated any price increases (or changes in other
terms) that sellers might adopt if the challenged terms were invali-

22. E-mail from James J. White to Richard Craswell (February 14, 2000) (on file with
author). This proposal was subsequently modified, see infra note 24, but I discuss it here in
its original form because that form so nicely illustrates the two contending views.
23. I set aside here the possibility that the language of subsequent invoice forms might
be interpreted as proposals to modify the original master agreement.
24. See e-mail from James J. White, supra note 22. This part of the proposed revision
failed to gain sufficient support, and was subsequently dropped (as was the corresponding
proposed comment, quoted infra note 25).
25. The proposed Comment to this revision stated that this language was intended to
strike a balance "between the buyer's need for protection from unexpected and unfair terms
with the buyer does not see until the product is delivered and the seller's need for an inex
pensive way of contracting with its buyers." Id.
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dated? And, however that question is answered, how would the re
sulting evaluation differ (if at all) from that which the court would
conduct if the same term were challenged under the general doctrine
of unconscionability? After all, any term that might be challenged
under the revised section 2-207(b) potentially would have been vul
nerable under unconscionability as well, for whenever the buyer has
"not otherwise agreed" to a term in the seller's standard form, the lack
of a real agreement might well count as a kind of procedural uncon
scionability. If so, most courts would then proceed to assess the sub
stantive unconscionability of the challenged term, by examining
(among other things) the actual effects of the clause on buyers.26 Such
an inquiry sounds very similar - and might even be identical - to the
proposed section 2-207(b)(3)'s instruction that courts assess the extent
to which a clause works "materially" to a buyer's detriment.

IV. CONCLUSION.
In short, many discussions of the battle of the forms (and many
proposals about how to fix the problem) reflect a fundamental am
bivalence between two contesting views. On one view, the battle of
the forms is a mere technical problem, which merely requires courts to
decide what to do when different documents do not quite match. On
another view, the battle of the forms poses a more fundamental prob
lem about unequal bargaining power. This second problem - like
that posed by the more general doctrine of unconscionability - re
quires courts to decide the deeper question of what to do when the
terms of contracts have not all been freely consented to (under some
appropriate definition of "freely").
Obviously, data such as Professor Keating's cannot, by itself, help
analysts choose between these two contesting views of the problem.
Keating's data can, however, provide a more realistic picture of the
contracting practices that are being analyzed, and in that capacity it
provides a useful service to analysts in either camp. While disagree
ments between the two camps will doubtless continue, they should
continue on a more informed basis.

26. The distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability was first
noted in Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967). For an economic analysis of this distinction, see Craswell,
supra note 11, at 17-20.

